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ABSTRACT. Geopolitical literature is experiencing a renaissance and scholars representing 
classical and critical perspectives in this field bring multifaceted assessments to historical 
and current international political and security issues. Sloan’s Geopolitics, Geography and 
Strategic History, which is part of Routledge’s Geopolitical Theory Series, examines 
connections between geography, strategy, and history and is the subject of this review and 
analysis. Three thesis questions examined by the author include why the geographical scope 
of political objectives and following strategies of nation states change, how do these 
changes occur, and over what time period do these changes occur. Sloan examines why the 
geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman remain relevant today 
by aspiring to produce an enhanced understanding of the relationships between geography, 
history, and strategy, British foreign policy and the Heartland, the role of these concepts 
involving Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic, the emergence of geopolitics in the U.S. 
during World War II, geopolitical analysis of Cold War containment, and emerging 
geopolitical aspects involving China and the U.S.’ Pacific Pivot. This assessment examines 
whether Sloan has succeeded in his objectives. 
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Introduction   
 
Geography remains a critical factor in analyzing the historical and contemporary 
policies and strategies of nation states. A foreword by Colin Gray cogently notes 
that much Western scholarship has neglected geography in analyses of international 
affairs which has resulted in deleterious scholarly consequences including geo- 
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graphical illiteracy and the inability to handle geographic data.1 University of 
Reading Politics and International Relations Professor Geoff Sloan believes there is 
a critically important and symbiotic relationship between geography, strategy, and 
history in geopolitics and that policymakers and scholars must understand a 
dynamic security environment focusing on “changes in transport and weapons 
technology, new locations of natural resources, and the emergence of new centers 
of economic power” with geopolitics synthesizing these divergent elements and 
providing coherence to their strategic implications.2   
     Sloan’s treatise goes on to examine two British, two American, and one Chinese 
case study of the relationships between geography, strategy, and history while con- 
cluding with the assertion that classical geopolitics is highly relevant to examining 
and interpreting contemporary international political, economic, and security devel- 
opments. Points stressed in Chapter 1 include examining the relationship between 
geopolitics, geography, and strategic history emphasizing geopolitics while stressing 
that securing political superiority involves more than having power from available 
natural resources, acquiring wealth, or power projection capability but also includes 
exercising power. This exercise of power can involve expanding or contracting due 
to evolving alliances, emerging new enemies, and shifts due to technological 
advances, incorrect policy decisions, and other salient factors. Sloan goes on to 
argue that foreign policy formulation must remain geographically dependent and 
cites construction of the Panama Canal as a pertinent example since this structure 
facilitated development of the U.S. having a two-ocean navy.3 
     Chapter 2 stresses classical geopolitical theories presented by Halford Mackinder 
(1861‒1947) and Nicholas Spykman (1893‒1943). Sloan maintains that a key tenet 
of Mackinder’s geopolitical thought is that geography and history are interrelated 
with historians using geography to facilitate historical interpretation and geographers 
using history to facilitate current interpretation. Mackinder maintained that future 
British policymakers must possess the following attributes to effectively manage 
British national interests: “They must have a global outlook…they must also have a 
trained power of judging values and be capable of long views in the framing 
policies for the future; and they will…still need an understanding of the momentum 
which both Man and his environment come up to the present from the past.”4 
     One scholarly analyst of Spykman’s work asserts he made extensive and deep 
use of material geographic realities in this theorizing while allowing for significant 
human discretion for good and bad and that Spykman consistently and explicitly 
opposed deterministic misuse of physical geographical detail in argumentation.5 
Sloan demonstrates how Spykman challenged a foundational U.S. assessment that 
its geographic distance could protect its national security from a continental alliance 
of Eurasian powers. Spykman asserted that a new geopolitical reality was emerging 
and that American national interests now transcended the Western Hemisphere and 
that it was possible for the U.S. to influence European and Asian politics and that 
the “old world” can influence the “new world.” Spykman’s rimland theory stressed 
this arguing: “Between the center of the Eurasian land mass and the circumferential 
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maritime route lies a great concentric buffer zone. It includes western and Central 
Europe; the plateau countries of the Near East, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, 
Tibet, China and Eastern Siberia, and the three peninsulas of Arabia, India and 
Burma-Siam.”6 
     Sloan proceeds to scrutinize British foreign policy and Mackinder’s Heartland 
theory whose contention was that Germany and Russia were attaining greater 
power due to weaknesses in the emerging post-World War I strategic order. He 
also maintained that newly created countries including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland would be vulnerable to German and Russian aggression and subversion 
and that Berlin and Moscow would battle for control of the Eastern European 
heartland asserting that: 
1. Who Rules East Europe Commands the Heartland. 
2. Who Rules the Heartland Commands the World Island. 
3. Who Rules the World Island Commands the World.7 
 
Mackinder maintained there was a subtle relationship between geography and 
human agency in policy decisions believing that while geographic environment did 
not define policymakers’ choices that it conditioned them. Sloan also notes that 
Mackinder stressed that following World War I that contemporary armies possessed 
railroads, cars, and airplanes making it possible for militaries to take easy possession 
of land masses and strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal. He also notes 
Mackinder’s 1943 conclusion that a victorious Soviet Union would become the 
world’s strongest land power and be in the strategically strongest defense 
position due to its possession of the heartland.8 
     Chapter 3 sees Sloan analyze Mackinder’s role as British High Commissioner 
during a November 1919‒January 1920 mission to the Soviet Union. Following his 
return, Mackinder issued a report on January 21, 1920 stressing the Communist 
regime’s danger to British interests and European democracies while also criticizing 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George for making speeches tending to undermine 
British strategic objectives and providing propaganda opportunities for Lenin’s 
Government and contributing to that regime’s triumph.9 
     Chapter 4 sees geopolitical assessment of Britain, Ireland, and the Battle of 
Atlantic. Sloan covers the evolution of Anglo-Irish relations from the 1916 Irish 
rebellion to Ireland’s independence in 1922 and events leading up to the outbreak 
of World War II. A key geostrategic factor in this bilateral relationship was the 
presence of British defense installations in Ireland in locales as varied as Bantry 
Bay, Cork, and Donegal for use in case of potential future military operations against 
powers as varied as France and the U.S. which was ended by a April 25, 1938 Anglo-
Irish agreement turning these ports over to Ireland despite Winston Churchill’s 
opposition warning that turning these ports over to Ireland would strengthen 
enemies with submarine fleets and make it harder to defend coastal British naval 
facilities.10 
This agreement, as Sloan demonstrates, saw Britain go to war in September 
1939 without having naval bases on Ireland’s south coast for the first time since 
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between 1689 and 1697. This agreement and the obstinacy of Irish Prime Minister 
Eamon De Valera’s Government caused the British Government to not take the 
previously reserved ports between October 1939 and spring 1940. Between July 
and October 1940, 282 ships were sunk by the Germans off Ireland’s northwestern 
approaches which included 1,489,795 tons of merchant shipping with Ireland’s 
neutrality playing a big factor in exacerbating allied difficulties during the Atlantic 
campaign in World War II’s early years. The British and allies eventually made 
heavy use of Northern Ireland’s naval facilities for the remainder of the war.11 
     Chapter 5 covers the emergence of U.S. geopolitical thought during World War 
II. Sloan covers the traditional role played by isolationism in U.S. foreign policy 
prior to Washington’s entrance into this conflict, how U.S. political and security 
objectives expended after European hostilities began and Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and emphasizes the roles of Mackinder and Spykman in shaping U.S. geo- 
political thought. Priority is placed on how the German School of Geopolitics was 
introduced to the U.S., that geopolitical analysis was used in a matter explaining 
the emergence and evolution of battles far from the U.S., and that geopolitics was 
developed and used by civilian and military institutions.  
     Sloan notes that the U.S. was a de facto international empire in 1914 with 
possessions in Hawaii, Midway, Wake Island, Guam, Samoa, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands while possessing the world’s third ranked Navy. Yet 
the aftermath of World War I, saw the reemergence of isolationism characterized 
by the utopian Kellogg-Briand Pact which delusionally sought to outlaw war “as an 
instrument of international policy.” U.S. foreign policy during the Harding,  
Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations sought to emphasize economic growth and 
preeminence through raising tariffs, insisting on allied war debt payments, demand- 
ing openness for U.S. trade and investment, expanding interest in Middle East oil, 
and assertively promoting U.S. business interests globally.12 
     The prewar period saw the emergence of geopolitical thinkers such as Isaiah 
Bowman (1878‒1950) who argued that Hitler’s claims of limited territorial objectives 
were deceitful and an increasing consensus among U.S. strategic policymakers that 
an emerging responsibility of U.S. naval forces in the Atlantic would be protecting 
sea communications with the United Kingdom and allied shipping against German 
threats. This emerging and expanding global maritime security responsibilities 
facing the U.S. were reflected in a 1942 speech by Roosevelt noting: “There are 
four main lines of communication that are now being traveled by our ships: the 
North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific. These 
routes are not one way streets, for ships that carry our troops and munitions out-
bound bring back essential raw materials that we need for our own use.13 
    Looking ahead to a potentially emerging postwar international geopolitical order, 
Bowman warned that the Balkan states were incapable of withstanding Russian 
subversion without U.S. military support and political leadership and that it may 
become necessary for the U.S. to stand against Russia. Mackinder also asserted that 
if the Soviet Union emerged victorious over Germany it would become the world’s 
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greatest landpower and possess the strongest defensive military position. Spykman 
stressed that the U.S. was a maritime power and that any existential threat to it 
came from a concentric buffer zone and circumferential maritime routes.14 
     Additional emerging geopolitical thinkers profiled by Sloan in this chapter 
include Robert Strausz-Hupe (1903‒2002) who stressed the influence of German 
geopolitical figures such as Karl Haushofer (1869‒1946) in driving German foreign 
policy, Andreas Dorpalen (1911‒1982) a biographer of Haushofer, Derwent Whitt- 
lesley (1890‒1956) whose 1942 work The German Strategy of World Conquest was 
funded by the Carnegie Corporation and included contributions from military 
agencies and the State and Justice Deparetment while featuring maps and other 
visual aids. This influence of geopolitics was also reflected in American popular 
culture from the role played by Frank Capra’s Why We Fight film series made 
between 1942 and 1945 and the magazine Reader’s Digest.15 
     World War II saw a seismic update in emphasis on geography and geopolitics in 
U.S. academic, governmental, and military institutions. 1942 saw 1,500 courses on 
geopolitics taught in U.S. universities, maps produced by government agencies as 
varied as the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, the Census Bureau, U.S. 
Geological Survey, the Map Division of the Office of Strategic Services, and 
geographers were actively involved in the War Department, Foreign Economic 
Administration, the Board on Geographic Names, and State Department.16 
    Chapter 6 focuses on the convergence of geopolitics, geography, and strategic 
history accelerated during the post war period as the U.S. and its allies sought to 
contain the Soviet Union and China. This period resulted in the emergence of 
critical documents such as NSC 68 which sought to contain the Soviet Union and 
the emergence of shooting wars in Korea and Vietnam which demonstrated the 
limits of military force and public willingness to support military operations to 
defend U.S. security interests. The roles played by individuals as varied as George 
Kennan (1904‒2005) and Henry Kissinger in U.S. strategic planning are chronicled 
and analyzed as are concepts such as the Domino Theory. Coverage of U.S. Cold 
War Soviet containment ends in 1973 and does not include events such as détente, 
the initial end of the Cold War resulting in the Soviet Union’s collapse between 
1989‒1991, and the reemergence of the Cold War contentiousness between the 
Russian Federation and the U.S. and its allies during Vladimir Putin’s presidency 
in the 21st century.17 
     Sloan’s final chapter covers the geopolitics of China and the U.S.’ Pacific Pivot.  
He begins this chapter by noting that Chinese elites do not publish an annual grand 
strategy document outlining their intentions, but that Chinese actions and 
expanding military capability also illustrate that Beijing is changing geopolitical 
reality in ways receiving limited recognition in scholarly literature.18 
     His analysis proceeds to note how divergent Chinese geographic terrains influ- 
ence Beijing’s geopolitical prerogatives including the Han Heartland and Monsoon 
Coastal East where the vast majority of Chinese live and includes natural features 
such as the Pearl, Yangtze, and Yellow Rivers serves as the preponderant location 
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for China’s arable land, and has historically represented a point of security vulner- 
ability as a result of 19th century British interventions, and proximity to international 





This chapter proceeds to stress that understanding contemporary Chinese geopolitics 
requires focusing on lines of communication, energy supply sources and structures, 
and how developing economic wealth centers may affect Chinese diplomatic 
relations. Additional characteristics of this section include stressing how economic 
growth and change has not reduced the Chinese Communist Party’s preeminence, 
China’s increasing demand for raw materials and how this had resulted in the need 
to gain secure access to these from foreign sources, Beijing’s desire to remove 
potential naval competitors from the South and East China Seas, and how these 
needs drive China to seek economic and political influence globally in areas as 
diverse as South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America.20  
    This growing Chinese assertiveness has created concern in the U.S. and its Asia-
Pacific allies that the post-World War II Pacific Ocean preeminence is threatened.  
In 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed in Foreign Policy 
that the 21st century would be the Pacific Century and geopolitics future would be 
decided in Asia. This article stressed that the Asia-Pacific was a key factor driving 
global politics while failing to define geopolitics, did not mention India, and failed 
to provide concrete resources or a coherent strategic response to China’s increasing 
assertiveness in this region. This Pacific Pivot also failed to comprehend the 
security and political implications of the seismic political changes taking place in 
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Eurasia, failed to evaluate the geographical scope of Chinese foreign policy and its 
grand strategy since 1978, and did not address the problems of maintaining security 
in the Pacific due to challenges being presented by China.21 
    Sloan’s conclusion reemphasizes a trinitarian connection between geography, 
strategy, and history which Sloan sees as being foundational to geopolitics. He 
notes evolving historical geopolitical challenges confronting the west including 
Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and China and different policies the U.S. and its 
allies have, are, and may need to engage in to ensure their geopolitical interests are 
not threatened. He maintains that classical geopolitics provides the flexibility and 
adaptability to enable policymakers to understand and react to emerging twenty-
first century geopolitical realities. 
 
Conclusion     
 
This is an erudite and well-reasoned analysis of historical and contemporary strategic 
trends and how classical geopolitics should be a key factor in examining the his- 
torical, contemporary, and emerging trends affecting emerging international politics 
and security. Suggestions for improvement include bringing analysis of contem- 
porary geopolitical challenges up to date by discussing the Suwalki Gap between 
Russia, Poland, and the Baltic republics and how this region could become a 
fulcrum for conflict between Putin’s Russia and NATO countries as Russia may 
seek to sever the Baltic Republics from the west and forcibly reintegrate them into 
territory occupied by the former Soviet Union. Suwalki Gap analysis should also be 
compared and contrasted with how the Fulda Gap was a key fulcrum of historical 





The concluding chapter on Chinese geopolitics and the Pacific Pivot is partially  
weakened by not incorporating China’s Anti-Access and Aerial Denial (A2AD) 
policy into its recommendations for how the U.S. and its allies can counter Chinese 
attempts to maintain dominance of this region by using its conventional, nuclear, 
and asymmetric forces to keep the U.S. and its allies from being able to conduct 
military operations in waters, land territory, and airspace, space-based assets, and 
cyber assets against Chinese attempts to achieve regional hegemony. The logistical 
and operational complications of effectively responding to Chinese A2AD are 
daunting and will be a key factor in the effectiveness of U.S. and allied responses 
to increasing Chinese geopolitical assertiveness.23 
 
 
Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
The book could also have been enhanced with closer editing in some places. For 
instance, note 36 on p. 59 in chapter 2 refers to a Colin Gray article on Spykman 
referring to him as a being a geographer or geopolitician as being anachronistic on 
p. 5 of the June 2015 edition of Journal of Strategic Studies. Instead, the actual 
reference to Spykman in Gray’s article is on p. 877 in this issue of this journal.  
Another example of a bibliographic reference oversight is found in note 138 on p. 
188 referencing an article from the journal Political Geography without mention- 
ing that the article was published in 1982. 
     Despite these shortcomings, this is an erudite and magisterial book enriching 
our understanding of how historical events and emerging geopolitical trends and 
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developments are enhanced by understanding the close relationship between geo- 
politics, geography, and strategic history and how the multidisciplinary relevance 
of these subjects makes classical geopolitics an essential prerequisite for analyzing, 
interpreting, and understanding international relations and history. Strongly recom- 
mended for all interested in these subjects! 
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